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An integral feature of today’s volatile labor markets is the perva-
sive use of temporary help and staffing firms to respond to the cycli-
cal economy’s fluctuating labor needs. Modern workplace law has not 
kept pace with this development. Federal labor law was enacted and 
developed during the middle decades of the twentieth century to gov-
ern stable, long-term employment relationships, not the vicissitudes of 
the now-ubiquitous temporary work relationship. The Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA) does not address temporary work in the 
statutory text, and it has not provided an effective regulatory regime to 
govern the operations of contemporary staffing firms and other profit-
driven labor market intermediaries (LMIs).1 Despite certain notable le-
gal breakthroughs and some exemplary efforts at creating alternative, 
nonexploitative agencies to challenge the likes of Labor Ready and 
Manpower, advocates of the rights of temporary workers have not yet 
crafted an effective legal framework that can advance the unionization 
and fair treatment of workers who are deployed by commercial, profit-
driven LMIs. In this regard, little attention has been paid to the legal 
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status of the for-profit temporary agency, the primary institution driv-
ing the expanded use of contingent workers. This chapter aims to help 
remedy this neglect by examining the history and sociolegal character 
of the temp agency, an institution which by conservative industry esti-
mates deploys more than 2.5 million workers each day—more than the 
number employed by Wal-Mart or the “Big Three” automakers com-
bined.
A central issue continually arises in the context of efforts to win 
meaningful labor rights for workers employed through commercial 
LMIs: how to legally characterize the status and obligations of the 
staffing agency that supplies “temp workers” when it is the user firm 
that actually engages these workers in productive labor. As previous re-
search has shown, determining which entity is the actual employer has 
profound repercussions for union organizing and for the application of 
a wide range of employment laws (Gonos 1997). Treating staffing agen-
cies as bona fide independent employers of agency workers, as was the 
NLRB’s accepted practice during the temp industry’s boom period in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, makes it practically impossible 
for temps to exercise their union rights. 
 It was only in 2000 that a landmark NLRB ruling offered a resolu-
tion to one aspect of this issue by recognizing the social and economic 
realities of contingent employment relationships involving temp agen-
cies. In M.B. Sturgis, Inc./Jeffboat Division2 the board reversed de-
cades-old policy on the status of temp workers, ruling that, for purposes 
of collective bargaining, the user firm is the actual employer of both the 
direct and temporary employees who are engaged in common work at 
the user firm’s place of business. Significantly, M.B. Sturgis recognized 
that in many circumstances staffing agencies have little or no claim to 
employer status and thus have no say as to whether temp workers join 
a union with workers permanently employed at the user firm’s busi-
ness. Moreover, the board indicated that the new policy driving its rul-
ing in M.B. Sturgis resulted from a significant shift in the employment 
paradigm, i.e., the “tremendous growth in the temporary help supply 
industry.”3 
Not surprisingly, whatever potential M.B. Sturgis may have had to 
advance the labor rights of temp workers was recently quashed by Pres-
ident Bush’s appointees to the NLRB. In November 2004, Chairman 
Robert J. Battista spearheaded a 3–2 decision reversing M.B. Sturgis. 
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The board’s decision in Oakwood Care Center and N&W Agency, Inc. 
revived the notion that contingent workers deployed by a temp agency 
cannot share a common bargaining unit with permanently employed 
workers without the permission of the temp agency.4 Despite the set-
back that Oakwood Care represents, M.B. Sturgis was a meaningful at-
tempt to provide a modicum of protection for temp workers’ rights and 
a laudable effort to creatively apply federal labor law to the widespread, 
but problematic, triangular employment relationship.
Yet, the analysis in M.B. Sturgis left an important question largely 
unanswered. If, as that ruling declared, the user firm is in many circum-
stances the actual employer of temp workers, then how does one legally 
characterize the temp agency? The answer offered in M.B. Sturgis—
that the user firm and the supplier firm are both employers of the temp 
workers—failed to address critical issues that arise when employers use 
temps to supplement their “regular” workforces. Consider, for example, 
what legal justification exists for the disparate wage rates often earned 
by temps and permanent workers who share a common work experi-
ence (a condition that the Sturgis decision tolerated even among those 
belonging to the same bargaining unit). Creating an effective regime of 
regulation for the commercial staffing industry requires that labor advo-
cates provide a more searching answer to the question of how to legally 
characterize commercial LMIs. 
Based on a reconsideration of their role in U.S. labor and legal his-
tory, this chapter argues that a fundamental shift in the current legal 
characterization of temporary help and staffing firms is necessary to 
effectuate a fair regime of regulation for these formidable players in the 
labor relations arena. The argument has four parts. First, we locate for-
profit employment agencies within the history of U.S. labor by present-
ing early examples of how the labor movement responded to abusive 
private staffing practices. Second, we discuss the rise and fall of the 
regulatory regime that constrained for-profit agencies for the larger part 
of the twentieth century, and, specifically, how the contemporary staff-
ing industry was able to escape effective regulation in the latter decades 
of the century by acquiring the undeserved legal status of “employer.” 
Third, we present empirical data and legal principles that call into ques-
tion staffing firms’ current de facto legal status as employers. 
Finally, informed by this sociolegal reevaluation of the staffing in-
dustry’s history and structure, we propose a legal reclassification, urg-
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ing legislative reform to assign temp agencies and staffing firms a dual 
status, that of employer and labor market intermediary, analogous to 
the legal characterization of the temp agency’s pro-worker counterpart, 
the union hiring hall. The notion of creating an explicit legal definition 
for commercial staffing agencies rests on a fundamental principle of 
U.S. labor law: parity in the legal treatment of employees by all par-
ties to the employment relationship.5 Currently, this principle is not ap-
plied to for-profit LMIs. As this chapter explains, in the last third of the 
twentieth century, the commercial staffing industry waged a successful 
national campaign to free itself of state government regulation. More-
over, certain historical factors permitted the industry to avoid express 
regulation under the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments to 
the LMRA. Given the prominent role of the private staffing industry in 
today’s labor markets, we argue that federal labor law should restore 
legal parity by subjecting for-profit temp and staffing firms to a regime 
of regulation and structural transparency similar to that which governs 
union hiring halls, their functional equivalent on the labor side of the 
employment equation.
THE TEMP AGENCY AND THE UNION HIRING HALL
Labor market intermediaries have played a prominent role in the 
U.S. economy, especially during periods of economic transition and 
high labor market volatility. This was evidenced in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, when the expansion of industrial capital-
ism spawned the rapid proliferation of private fee-charging agencies to 
supply cheap, no-frills labor to a range of industries. This era also wit-
nessed a response to this form of exploitation in the growth and insti-
tutionalization of union hiring halls in certain economic sectors. Thus, 
the union hiring hall and the commercial staffing agency arose as two 
primary kinds of labor market intermediaries, occupying—at times in 
direct competition with each other—a common socioeconomic niche, 
i.e., both organized and provided human capital to industry on a short-
term, seasonal, or cyclical basis.
Today, although both forms of LMIs operate in the labor market, 
multinational corporations such as Manpower and Adecco clearly dom-
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inate the field, with outlets in large and small communities throughout 
the United States and the world. Also ubiquitous are small ad hoc or 
specialized commercial temp operations, providing lower-cost, no-frills 
labor in industries as varied as fish processing, manufacturing, account-
ing, and law. At the same time, union hiring halls persist and continue 
to provide skilled and semiskilled labor to employers on a seasonal and 
temporary basis, most notably in the construction, maritime, and en-
tertainment industries. One thing is clear: as long as the current need 
for cyclical and temporary labor remains high, LMIs will remain an 
important feature of the economy. It remains an open historical ques-
tion, however, whether the predominant form of LMI will engage in 
the commercial exploitation of workers employed in fluid labor mar-
kets or, alternatively, some kind of pro-worker vehicle will emerge that 
can meet the flexible labor needs of our society and, at the same time, 
provide workers with labor representation, decent compensation, and 
a level of empowerment associated with the unionized sectors of the 
economy.
Disparate Legal Treatment of Two Equivalent Labor  
Market Institutions
Wilborn (1997) offers a useful functional definition of labor market 
intermediaries that explains the similarities between union hiring halls 
and temporary staffing agencies. He points out that both these kinds 
of LMIs limit frictional unemployment, i.e., the time a worker spends 
searching for work, and both have the potential to provide an institu-
tional continuity that allows workers to acquire medical/welfare cover-
age and pension benefits that otherwise would be unavailable to them 
as contingent workers.6 Further, both union hiring halls and commercial 
staffing firms are often the contractually designated gatekeepers that 
provide an exclusive vehicle by which employees gain access to jobs in 
a given industry or with a certain employer.7 In the mid-1990s, Business 
Week noted the functional similarity of temp agencies like Labor Ready 
and union hiring halls in that both provide employers with a “database 
of willing workers” (Weiss 1996). Or, as one federal appellate court re-
cently put it, an “exclusive hiring hall is akin to an employment agency 
where all employees hired by an employer are those referred by the 
union.”8
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Another key structural characteristic shared by both types of LMIs 
is crucial to our argument for subjecting commercial staffing agencies 
to strict regulation: Throughout the history of modern U.S. capitalism, 
unregulated labor market intermediaries of all kinds have been prime 
purveyors of workplace abuse and exploitation.9 On point is a recent 
article in the New York Times, titled “Middlemen in the Low-Wage 
Economy,” which reports on the inherently exploitive triangular rela-
tionship involving private labor contractors, low-wage workers, and the 
economic conglomerates that actually employ contingent labor (Green-
house 2003). This is but one of an ever-increasing number of stories 
about contingent workers brought to public attention in recent years 
by labor activists, scholars, and journalists, that makes it clear that the 
pervasive use of unregulated commercial LMIs continues to result in 
widespread abuse of a vulnerable strata of workers. Notably, at this 
historical juncture, unregulated LMIs, i.e., commercial temp and staff-
ing agencies, dominate the contingent labor market, while their highly 
regulated counterpart, the union hiring hall, is relegated to a relatively 
marginal role as a provider of labor.
The assertion that union hiring halls and commercial staffing firms 
perform common socioeconomic functions is not intended to gloss over 
their significant differences. Workers organized and dispensed by temp 
agencies experience substandard wages, nonexistent benefits, high lev-
els of alienation, and long-term economic insecurity, while workers 
organized and represented by union hiring halls are not subject to any-
thing like the same level of exploitation and uncertainty (Polivka, Co-
hany, and Hipple 2000). Indeed, rarely, if at all, are workers employed 
through union hiring halls considered “contingent” workers since they 
have acquired a level of income, job stability, and benefits that are char-
acteristic of workers in the mainstream economy. A second related but 
largely unexplored distinction separates union hiring halls and staffing 
agencies: the diametrically opposite paths that government regulation 
of these two different types of labor market intermediaries has taken. 
Today, union hiring halls are highly regulated under federal labor law, 
while staffing agencies are largely unregulated and unchecked at both 
the state and federal levels. Given their near-equivalent economic func-
tions, it is worth exploring what accounts for such disparate levels of 
government regulation.
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The Rise of a Regulatory Regime for Private Employment Agencies
From the late nineteenth century until World War II, a constant 
stream of public criticism targeted the widespread abuses fostered by 
the private employment agency business. Voluminous government re-
ports catalogued the standard industry abuses: excessive fees charged to 
workers, collusion with employers, and various forms of extortion and 
misrepresentation (see, e.g., U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 
1916). Fee-charging practices in particular became a widely recognized 
“social evil” in early twentieth century labor markets.10 Private agents 
earned the label of “employment sharks” by charging exorbitant fees 
and sending workers to nonexistent jobs. Agencies and employers col-
luded to bilk workers by intentionally promoting high turnover, hiring 
and quickly dismissing workers referred by the agency to maximize the 
number of fees collected (Gonos 2001). One of the earliest labor strug-
gles and legal battles addressing these employment agency practices 
occurred in Spokane, Washington, in 1909, led by militant workers af-
filiated with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Their orga-
nizing, soap box speechmaking, and massive civil disobedience (over 
400 arrests) inspired a successful boycott of the exploitive agencies by 
migratory workers and culminated in a statewide ballot referendum in 
which voters banned private fee-charging agencies (Foner 1965, pp. 
177–185). The battle only ended when a U.S. Supreme Court decision, 
Adams v. Tanner,11 employing the now-discredited constitutional doc-
trine of liberty of contract, held that the Fourteenth Amendment pre-
vented the Washington legislature from banning private fee-charging 
agencies. Over the course of struggles like the one in Spokane, workers 
came to favor the establishment of free public or union-operated em-
ployment offices as an alternative to mistreatment at the hand of the 
agency sharks.
Along with workers’ protests, government investigations of private 
agencies laid the basis for extensive state and municipal regulation. As 
early as 1914, 25 states had detailed employment agency laws on the 
books, and 19 had established free labor exchanges as an alternative 
to for-profit offices. State regulation typically required licensing and 
bonding of agency operators. The laws also placed ceilings on fees or 
required that fee schedules be posted or filed with the state. Agencies 
were required to keep records, open to inspection, of all placements 
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made and fees charged, and receipts had to be provided to workers. Many 
state laws made extra charges for additional “services” illegal, and also 
mandated refunds of fees when jobs were not obtained or turned out to 
be of short duration. Most states outlawed collusive fee-splitting, where 
agencies and employers shared in the fees charged to workers. Statutory 
provisions also prohibited misleading ads and required that workers be 
informed of labor disputes so as to allow them to avoid functioning as 
scabs. The laws had teeth that provided remedies for victims and crimi-
nal penalties for agents that violated the law (Moses 1971). Still, public 
outrage regularly flared up over continued gross abuses, leading to calls 
for even stricter regulation (e.g., Andrews 1929).
It was only in the “New Deal period” that public enmity toward 
private employment agencies was quieted. During this period, employ-
ers strengthened internal labor markets as a means of recruiting and 
retaining workers, aided in large measure by the growth of industrial 
unionism, which secured job stability. In external labor markets, the 
free public Employment Service was firmly institutionalized, comple-
menting the relatively strict regime of state regulation that was in place 
for private employment agencies—the precursors of the modern tempo-
rary help firm. Through the mid-1960s, state departments of labor vig-
orously pursued enforcement of employment agency laws for both per-
manent and temporary placements, and the U.S. Department of Labor 
provided strong federal support (U.S. Department of Labor 1962). As 
a result, the private employment agency became, relatively speaking, a 
marginalized actor in the labor marketplace, and its abusive practices 
became much less prevalent.
Federal Regulation of Union Hiring Halls
Union hiring halls came into existence as a means of ending the 
irregularity of work in temporary and seasonal labor markets, and to 
ameliorate employer discrimination and other abuses associated with 
the hiring process. A notable example is the celebrated West Coast long-
shoreman’s strike in 1934, which aimed to establish an independent 
union hiring hall as a response to years of abuse at the hands of a com-
pany-dominated shape-up (Yellen 1974, pp. 327–334). Widely recog-
nized as one of the labor battles that paved the way for the successes of 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the campaign was car-
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ried out by “casual” employees who sought unionism and a hiring hall 
as a means of ending the exploitation associated with their contingent 
employment status. But in the years following World War II, there was 
growing recognition that union hiring halls can also subject workers to 
unfair treatment, and their practices came under harsh criticism from 
antiunion forces. As a result of two rounds of revision to the NLRA, 
union hiring halls are now subject to an extensive set of federal regula-
tions that, however pertinent they may be, do not apply to commercial 
staffing agencies.
First, the Taft-Hartley amendments spelled an end to the closed 
shop, which was well established in many industries where hiring 
halls predominated; no longer could employees be compelled to join a 
union as a condition of seeking employment. Second, the addition of a 
new class of union unfair labor practices in Section 8(b) of the LMRA 
provided administrative and judicial remedies to workers for a host of 
unfair practices that might be committed by a union-run hiring hall. 
Hence, a union hiring hall cannot force an employer to discriminate 
against applicants or employees so as to encourage or discourage union 
membership,12 nor make access to skills programs dependent on union 
membership, or on a requirement that referral be from a union mem-
ber.13 Access to referral list information and out-of-work lists that serve 
as the basis for job referrals must be made available to all persons using 
the hiring hall.14 Failure to abide by lists that determine the order in 
which applicants are to be referred is illegal. Further, separate and apart 
from being subject to unfair labor practice claims, union hiring halls are 
also subject to suit in federal court by any user when a departure from 
established hiring hall procedures results in a denial of employment.15 
Finally, union hiring halls cannot charge fees not reasonably related to 
the cost of providing their services.
Another provision of federal labor law germane to our analysis is 
the outright ban of negotiated prehire agreements outside the construc-
tion industry. Prehire agreements that permit a union to negotiate a con-
tract without achieving majority status are considered highly suspect 
because they impose terms of employment on unrepresented workers. 
The fact that such agreements are routine business transactions in the 
commercial staffing industry reveals the glaring contrast in the scope of 
regulation between union hiring halls and for-profit LMIs. Significant-
ly, it was only after extensive debate that the Landrum-Griffin amend-
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ments to the LMRA allowed even the limited use of prehire agreements, 
and then only in accordance with specific objective guidelines (Hardin 
1998, pp. 1517–1523).16
In sum, under federal labor law, union hiring halls have become 
highly regulated LMIs. Consequently, they function transparently, their 
operations easily subject to open scrutiny by users to ensure fair, neu-
tral practices. Many of the regulations governing union hiring halls are 
analogous to state regulations, which used to govern employment agen-
cies. Yet, none of these federal regulations apply to commercial temp 
or staffing agencies. Unlike union hiring halls, the story of commercial 
staffing agencies since the post–World War II period is one of almost 
complete deregulation, as discussed next.
The Fall of Regulation Governing the Commercial 
Staffing Industry
The last 25 years of the twentieth century saw the steady decline of 
the New Deal model of employment—based on long-term attachment 
to a single employer—and heralded the return of high velocity labor 
markets reminiscent of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
With this came a resurgence of for-profit LMIs in the U.S. economy, 
signaled by the now legendary expansion of the temporary help indus-
try that began in the 1970s. Ironically, the temporary help industry, a 
branch of the old employment agency business, was founded immedi-
ately after the close of World War II, the same time that the Taft-Hartley 
amendments weakened the position of organized labor. Nonetheless, 
consistent with the proregulatory mindset of the postwar period, tem-
porary help offices were classified as employment agencies well into 
the 1960s, and state lawmakers and regulatory agencies continued to 
regulate them under laws that, as noted earlier, were enacted early in 
the twentieth century.
Over the next several decades, however, the industry fought for and 
won exemption from these laws and fashioned an existence in what an 
earlier government study had called the “no man’s land” between state 
and federal labor regulation (U.S. Department of Labor 1943, p. 16). 
Astonishingly, the deregulation of this entire industry was achieved not 
through the searching process of judicial review, but rather by politi-
cal means. Beginning in the 1950s, the young temporary help industry 
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(later renamed the “staffing industry”) organized a low-profile, fierce, 
protracted, and ultimately successful assault on the states’ regulatory 
regimes. Largely unopposed, and without any public hearings or de-
bate, the industry managed between 1961 and 1971 to induce business-
oriented state legislatures across the country to enact relatively simple 
but far reaching statutory modifications of existing employment agency 
laws (Gonos 1997).
Through its lawmaking efforts, the industry achieved two related, 
crucial objectives. First, it evaded the classification of temporary help 
firms as “employment agencies,” thus exempting them from state regu-
lation and oversight; and second, it redefined temp firms as statutory 
“employers,” a status that was institutionalized in practice throughout 
the country in subsequent years.17
Winning employer status for temp agencies was literally the key to 
success for the emerging temp industry. Temp agencies’ newly minted 
employer status effectively shielded user firms from most legal obli-
gations toward agency workers, and ultimately, this became the temp 
industry’s unspoken raison d’etre. Importantly, this legal change facili-
tated a split workforce strategy whereby workers “employed” by the 
staffing agency were now understood as comprising a separate and dis-
tinct unit, despite the similarity in work performed by “regular” and 
“temporary” employees. Even before this so-called “core and periph-
ery” staffing strategy was sanctioned by the NLRB,18 the employer sta-
tus of temp firms made it almost impossible for temps to organize or 
join existing bargaining units at their place of work over the last three 
decades of the twentieth century. The importance of this fact was noted 
in the final report of the Dunlop Commission.19
The other aspect of the staffing industry’s political victory—avoid-
ing the classification of temp firms as employment agencies—was 
also crucial. The detailed provisions of state employment agency law, 
many parallel to those governing union hiring halls under federal law, 
were made irrelevant by the temp industry’s aggressive lobbying ef-
fort to avoid state regulation. Temp firms were no longer required to 
keep records of placements made, wages paid, and fees charged open 
to inspection, as they previously had been in 37 states. Nor were they 
subject to different forms of fee regulation, as they had been in 30 states 
where statutory provisions reflected decades of public opposition to 
widespread abuses and exploitive fee charges. In short, deregulation 
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eliminated the transparency and public scrutiny that state regulation of 
staffing agencies was intended to achieve, replacing this with secrecy in 
regard to placement practices, fees, and the wages and other terms ne-
gotiated with client companies. Thus, the temp agency—an institution 
never considered by law or popular wisdom to have fulfilled the social 
function of employer—achieved employer status politically and es-
caped the purview of state employment agency regulation under which 
its predecessors had operated for most of the twentieth century. 
Yet, ironically, due to the very fact that staffing agencies were not 
considered employers for most of the last century, they have also large-
ly passed below the radar of federal labor regulation, which has as its 
primary concern the relationship between employers, employees, and 
labor organizations. As federal labor law was being developed, employ-
ment agencies, including those handling temporary labor, were tacitly 
understood as labor market neutrals engaged in simply “matching” em-
ployees with employers. As such, they were ignored in the NLRA, and 
their regulation—or lack thereof—was left to the states. At the same 
time that industry efforts to deregulate temp firms were beginning to 
make headway, government regulation of labor unions and union hiring 
halls was being increased. With passage of the Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments in 1959, labor unions became subject to a range of reporting and 
disclosure requirements, as well as to claims for violation of an indi-
vidual member’s rights, so as to protect workers from abuses by unions 
and hiring halls run by them. 
But while the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments pur-
portedly established statutory parity between employers and labor orga-
nizations—subjecting both to claims of unfair labor practices—private 
employment agencies and their progeny, temporary help and staffing 
firms, were given no clear classification in this statutory scheme. To 
this day, their status remains largely unaddressed by federal labor law, 
despite the fact that they have formally abandoned a neutral posture.20 
Consequently, the staffing industry is free of any particular federal or 
state oversight of its operation as a labor market intermediary. As a re-
sult, widespread agency abuses of the same kinds as those encountered 
by workers early in the twentieth century have returned as a daily fea-
ture of the employment scene. 
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RECONCEPTUALIZING THE LEGAL STATUS OF TEMP 
AND STAFFING FIRMS
The presumptive employer status that staffing firms have come to 
hold in practice lacks a solid socioeconomic or legal foundation and has 
become subject to a critical reassessment. Indeed, what the NLRB con-
siders the most important factor in deciding employer status, the degree 
of control exercised over the work of employees, is usually nonexistent 
in the relationship between the staffing agency and temp worker.21 The 
legal treatment of staffing firms as “employers” rests almost entirely 
on the fact that they perform a series of ministerial acts—issuing pay-
checks, collecting withholding tax, and carrying workers’ compensa-
tion insurance.22 Hence, their employer status is increasingly seen as 
tenuous and flawed.23
Of many recent legal decisions that have effectively eroded the legal 
status of staffing firms as employers, we highlight three. Consider first 
Vizcaino v. Microsoft,24 which involved long-term “contractors” who 
worked under the direct supervision of Microsoft managers on soft-
ware products integral to the company’s core business. Because they 
were payrolled through outside staffing agencies, Microsoft officially 
treated them as “temporary” nonemployees and denied them company 
benefits and other rights and privileges enjoyed by similarly situated 
traditional employees. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
agency temps were employees of Microsoft—not the staffing firms—
and therefore entitled to participate in the company’s stock purchase 
plan. Ultimately, this case cast a bright light on the staffing industry’s 
practices and called into question temp agencies’ status as the “real em-
ployers” of temp workers.25
In the second case, Sturgis,26 the NLRB addressed the question of 
who is the employer of temp agency employees for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining. The conditions were typical of the standard staff-
ing arrangement: temps supplied by the staffing agencies performed the 
same work as unionized employees, under common work and safety 
rules, and were subject to the same user firm supervision. The board 
found “no evidence of any assignment or direction by the onsite [agen-
cy] representative.” Differences in employment conditions were lim-
ited to wage rates, availability of overtime and, presumably, the rules 
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for hiring and promotions. In its landmark decision, the NLRB held 
that the consent of both the user and supplier firms is not required in 
order to permit the temporary employees bargaining unit status at the 
user employer’s place of business.27 Pointing out that “all of the work 
is being performed for the user employer” and that “all the employ-
ees in fact share the same employer, i.e., the user employer,” the board 
concluded that staffing agencies are not “independent employers.” In 
circumstances such as this, i.e., when the locus of control rests entirely 
with the user employer, the board recognized that the supplier’s consent 
to include the temp workers in the unit is irrelevant. Instead, the tradi-
tional community of interest test should determine the composition of 
the appropriate bargaining unit.
In a subsequent case, Tree of Life, the board extended this reasoning 
by ruling that a unionized user firm was obligated to include agency 
temps in its bargaining unit and had a duty to bargain over those aspects 
of the temps’ working conditions that it controlled.28 In a modification 
of the administrative law judge’s ruling, the board backed away from 
what would have been a truly significant ruling: ordering that union 
wage rates be applied to the temps. This severely blunted the poten-
tially explosive nature of the ruling. Notably, however, in a concurring 
opinion, board member Wilma B. Leibman stated that she would have 
upheld the ALJ’s ruling applying all the terms and conditions of the 
collective bargaining agreement—including those affecting wages—to 
the temporary workers, “just as if the [user employer] had hired them 
without using an intermediary.” Although Tree of Life suggests an un-
willingness to provide a remedy for the core disparities in pay and bene-
fits experienced by temp workers, the decision nonetheless signaled the 
board’s continuing recognition of the organizational reality that staffing 
firms control virtually none of the terms and conditions of the workers 
they supply to client firms.29
Another rationale also calls into question the staffing firm’s status 
as employers. Harper (1998) argues that the test for determining who 
is an employer for purposes of collective bargaining should not hinge 
solely on supervisory control, but rather on whether a given entity is 
a “primary direct capital provider,” i.e., whether a business supplies a 
substantial proportion of the capital made productive by the employ-
ees. This formula would also exclude staffing firms from the category 
of employers, even in circumstances where a staffing agency takes on 
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a certain degree of supervisory authority over temp workers at a user 
firm’s place of business. This analysis highlights an obvious structural 
characteristic of temp and staffing agencies: these entities perform few, 
if any, of the traditional economic functions associated with bona fide 
employers that utilize labor to make their capital productive.
TOWARDS A LEGAL RECLASSIFICATION OF 
COMMERCIAL LMIS
The previous analysis calls into question the classification of temp 
and staffing firms as mere employers, and it underscores the need for a 
definition that more accurately describes their sociolegal character. In 
this regard, an important lesson can be applied from the legal treatment 
of union hiring halls. Federal labor law has long characterized union 
hiring halls as having a dual status, as nominal employers and, more 
importantly, as labor organizations, i.e., a type of LMI. As one federal 
court of appeals explained, “When a union operates a hiring hall and 
assumes a dual role of employer and representative, its obligation to 
deal fairly extends to all users of the hiring hall” (emphasis added).30 
Because temp and staffing firms perform functions equivalent to union 
hiring halls, it makes sense to craft a legal definition that assigns to 
them an analogous dual status—as nominal employers but primarily as 
LMIs. By the same logic, the law should impose on commercial staffing 
agencies the obligation of fair dealing with workers that is imposed on 
a labor union that administers a hiring hall.
Subjecting temp agencies to a set of legal obligations similar to 
those imposed on its prolabor counterpart would achieve the goal of 
restoring parity to the legal treatment of these two predominant kinds 
of LMIs. Certainly the commercial nature of temp and staffing firms 
does not change the economic realities surrounding the employment 
relationships they foster, nor does it justify a privileged legal classifica-
tion exempting them from government oversight. In fact, since labor 
unions and nonprofit organizations historically generated less suspicion 
of wrongdoing, it was these organizations that were usually exempted 
from coverage by early state employment agency laws.
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The Temp Agency as an Exploitative Labor Market Intermediary
Research has revealed an array of common abuses perpetrated by 
contemporary temp and staffing firms. Case studies by journalists, ac-
ademics, unions, and community organizations now span several de-
cades, recording a host of temp industry abuses too numerous to list 
completely in this chapter (Henson 1996; e.g., Rogers 2000). What fol-
lows is a summary of the well-documented abuses of temp workers by 
this industry.
Favoritism and the use of arbitrary criteria in making assignments 
are common complaints among temps. Moreover, pay rates can vary 
widely for the same jobs and even within the same workplace. Since no 
receipt or written agreement is provided, temps are left with no recourse 
when, through “bait and switch” tactics, they are paid at a lower rate 
than promised. And fees—measured as the temp agency’s markup over 
wages paid—are exorbitant, far beyond the levels that state regulations 
had historically permitted. This has not prevented temp agencies from 
also charging workers for safety equipment, transportation, or check 
cashing.
Misleading advertisements of “temp-to-perm” arrangements are 
widely used as a marketing technique to present temp employment as a 
stepping stone to a “real” job. But these empty promises specify no time 
period or performance criteria by which a worker will be converted to 
“permanent” worker status. Consequently, workers can be indefinitely 
strung along in “temporary” work arrangements without benefits or job 
security. Moreover, because temps are not employees of the user firm, 
they often do not benefit from handbooks or established work rules that 
provide even the bare minimum of fair treatment. As a result, temps 
are used to intensify the pace of work and perform the least desirable 
tasks. Agencies routinely require temps at all levels to sign legally dubi-
ous noncompete agreements containing restrictive covenants that put a 
“price on their head” if they accept a permanent position with the user 
employer. Long a constant complaint among temps, these agreements 
are the basis of the oft-heard charge that agency work is a modern form 
of indentured servitude. Staffing agencies deliberately obstruct work-
ers from access to unemployment insurance or workers compensation, 
and judicial decisions provide examples of how staffing agencies shield 
their client firms from claims of race or gender discrimination.
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Not surprisingly, today’s complaints are not qualitatively different 
from those expressed by agency workers a century ago, before state 
regulation of private agencies addressed the most exploitive condi-
tions of temporary employment. Simply put, they are standard to the 
unregulated operation of for-profit LMIs and more than justify a call for 
strict regulation. To date, however, community-based organizations and 
some progressive legislators have been able to enact only a piecemeal 
bundle of state laws that, for example, prohibit certain specific exploi-
tive practices, such as charges for transportation and check cashing. 
There has been no comprehensive effort to reregulate the commercial 
staffing industry.
Why Staffing Agencies Should Owe a Duty of Fair Representation 
to Temp Workers
A strong case can be made for imposing a comprehensive duty of 
fair representation on temp and staffing firms, analogous to that which 
federal law now imposes on labor unions. Commercial staffing agen-
cies make their profit by negotiating an agreement with user firms to 
deploy workers in productive jobs at the user firm’s business for an 
amount greater than the wages paid the temp workers. Indeed, the temp 
agency in most respects acts as if it were representing the workers’ best 
interests in bargaining with the user firm. However, as we have pointed 
out, temp workers deployed under this arrangement are extremely vul-
nerable and subject to exploitation. Moreover, the negotiating activi-
ties of staffing agencies impede workers’ ability to engage in concerted 
activity to effectuate meaningful bargaining over the terms and con-
ditions of their employment. The nature of the triangular relationship 
itself—involving a user employer, a staffing agency, and a temporary 
employee—results in a level of abuse that in the past has justified the 
adoption of a regulatory regime that imposed on private agencies an 
obligation of fair treatment, akin to a fiduciary duty, in order to protect 
workers. Because staffing agencies, like labor unions, are both gate-
keepers to employment opportunities and representatives involved in 
setting the terms and conditions of work, imposing a legal obligation 
akin to a duty of fair representation is appropriate and necessary.
Consider the usual scenario: staffing agency personnel meet or com-
municate with representatives of the user firm to discuss costs and ex-
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change proposals concerning the agency’s billing rates and the pay rates 
of various classes of workers the agency is to send (and in some cases 
other conditions of employment, e.g., procedures for handling griev-
ances and dismissals). Hidden from workers, billing rates and wages 
are settled in private negotiations so as to allow for “cost savings” to 
the user firm and a reasonable operating margin for the agency.31 In this 
process, user firms treat an agency’s staff, for all intents and purposes, 
as the temp employees’ representatives, explicitly recognizing their au-
thority to come to agreement on wage rates, to sign contracts, and to 
take wage offers back to workers. The parties conclude what amounts to 
a prehire collective bargaining agreement, banned for unions in all but 
the construction industry because it is seen as violating workers’ right 
to choose their own representatives.
The staffing agency acts as if it were representing the workers’ in-
terests, opportunistically advertising that it provides workers with good 
wages and benefits at the user firm’s business. Staffing industry execu-
tives are careful to avoid language denoting worker representation, but 
local agency managers are less guarded. “We are the unions now,” one 
says. Or, as an industry enthusiast from the Cato Institute states, “The 
supposedly unique services of unions—bargaining on behalf of workers 
for higher wages, improving worker skills, providing access to desired 
benefits or flexibility—are being duplicated by staffing companies that 
deliver those services to individual workers more efficiently and more 
broadly” (Lips 1998, p. 31). These candid comments from those “on 
the ground” more accurately reflect social reality than staffing industry 
propaganda.
Mimicking labor unions, staffing agencies go to great lengths to 
become what amounts to the exclusive agents of workers, monopolizing 
access to certain job markets. On their application, workers are required 
to sign an agreement not to discuss wages or conditions of employment 
directly with representatives of the user firm.32 Likewise, user firms are 
expressly instructed in agency contracts not to discuss wages or any 
personnel matters directly with temp workers, to deal only through the 
staffing agency.33
Staffing agencies’ monopolistic lock on access to jobs restricts work-
ers’ mobility. Temp workers often have little or no ability to choose an 
agency to represent them, or to deal directly with employers. For exam-
ple, in “payrolling” arrangements, workers recruited directly by large 
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corporate employers are required to affiliate with a specific agency as a 
condition of being hired and must sign a noncompete agreement, even 
if they found the assignment on their own (Neuwirth 2002; van Jaars-
veld 2000, p. 130). Workers who apply directly are referred to this “pre-
ferred vendor” (Smith 1998, p. 422; Strong 2001, pp. 667–668).34 Job 
seekers in smaller communities face a similar situation, often finding 
that employment opportunities listed in the classified ads of the local 
daily newspaper are available only through particular temporary help 
agencies (McAllister 1998, p. 223).
In effect, staffing agencies having exclusive contracts with em-
ployers resemble closed-shop hiring halls, illegal for unions under the 
LMRA. Even in situations where hiring halls are lawful, the LMRA 
precludes such exclusive hiring arrangements absent certain assur-
ances that workers are hired by objective criteria (including training, 
seniority, etc.) to eliminate arbitrary and unfair practices.35 And in all 
circumstances where exclusive bargaining and representation is lawful 
for unions, the law imposes on them a duty of fair representation. There 
is good reason to treat temp and staffing agencies in the same manner. 
The words of “temps” at Microsoft speak volumes on this point:
[I]f we are truly independent, then let us choose our own agen-
cy. S&T [the agency] offers its workers poor customer service 
. . . Yet, because it is a ‘preferred vendor’ in my job category I 
could not escape their clutches when I found a new assign-
ment . . . because of their preferred status, they have no incen-
tive to improve their service. They’ll get workers no matter how 
messed up they are. When I tried to change agencies between 
assignments, an MS contingent staffing person told me twice, 
‘Microsoft reserves the right to choose your payroll agency.’ 
 I know of another agency that will compensate me more ($, 
paid health and dental) without carrying over the cost to Microsoft. 
Volt [the agency] has done nothing to re-negotiate compensation 
even though original job spec has changed . . . Volt has never con-
tacted me to ask if I’m satisfied . . . (van Jaarsveld 2000, p. 129)
Workers’ rights of self-organization and freedom to choose their 
own representatives are obviously impaired in these situations.36 They 
are not solicited for input in setting targets and have no voice in the 
negotiations. It is a common complaint among temps that when con-
tracts are renegotiated, agencies do not always request a wage increase. 
Clearly, the staffing or temp agency’s substantive bargaining relation-
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ship with the user employer is one of collusion with that employer to 
minimize workers’ wages and benefits and to maximize profits. As the 
following comments of another agency worker indicate, there is often 
a feeling of betrayal, or in legal terms what can be characterized as a 
breach of fiduciary duty, in the way temp agencies treat the workers 
they deploy:
During the negotiations for pay rate, I felt that [the agency] repre-
sented Microsoft’s best interest and not my own. I had agreed to 
a rate with the MS manager and [the agency] still tried to get me 
to accept a lower rate of pay . . . The discussions I had with [the 
agency] were limited. 
 I think it’s unfortunate that all temps are beholden to their agen-
cies, which are beholden to Microsoft . . . [M]y temp agency (and 
all the others, because they’re all in the same boat) will fight only 
so hard for me, because if they do something to tick Microsoft off, 
Microsoft can decide not to use them any more. (van Jaarsveld 
2000, p. 115–116)
Thus, the private staffing arrangement effectively precludes temp 
workers from engaging in bargaining themselves or involving labor 
unions to represent them in negotiating the terms and conditions of em-
ployment under which they work. Yet, in most everyday situations agen-
cies do not stand up for the workers they deploy. Rather, as one study 
says, major staffing firms help maintain “workplace and labor-market 
discipline . . . driving down and holding down the costs/wages of cheap 
labor” (Peck and Theodore 2001, p. 494; see also Forde 2001). 
This is also evident in the temp agency’s handling of grievances. 
In Kelly Services’ contract with a major client, for instance, we find 
that “Kelly hears and acts upon complaints from its employees about 
working conditions, etc.” Again emphasizing their exclusive represen-
tational capacity, Kelly and other firms instruct their clients never to 
discuss grievances directly with temp employees. “[H]ave Kelly in-
teract with temp employees where personnel matters arise,” the client 
agreement states.37 But workers speak about staffing agencies’ lack of 
vigor in representing their interests on these matters: “ . . . I noticed that 
most agencies, even when they knew I was being taken advantage of, 
they wouldn’t go to bat for you . . . They very often wimped out. They 
wanted to keep the accounts or whatever: ‘Just accommodate them.’ 
What does that mean, ‘accommodate them’?” (Rogers 2000, p. 105) 
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Temp workers’ grievances are typically not conveyed to the em-
ployer, but rather bottled up in the agency. In shielding the employer 
from temp employees’ actual complaints and demands, commercial 
agencies shirk the duty to fairly represent workers that their own claims 
have implied they would fulfill.
Absent the legal imposition of a duty to fairly represent temp work-
ers, it is hard to imagine how temp workers will achieve fair treatment 
by the temp industry. Moreover, the imposition of such a duty in this 
industry does no more than bring a fair measure of parity to the legal 
treatment of all labor market intermediaries, whether they are private, 
for-profit companies or bona fide labor organizations.
CONCLUSION: CORRECTING THE IMBALANCE
Forbath (1991) has forcefully argued that the descriptive language 
of the law can shape the political consciousness of those engaged in 
labor struggles, possibly enhancing the fight for workers’ rights. In this 
spirit, this chapter aims to provide labor activists and scholars with le-
gal concepts and language that better capture the actual role of the temp 
or staffing agency, so that meaningful and realistic regulation can be 
part of the program of current and future labor struggles.
The temporary help industry is certainly deserving of the atten-
tion it has received from critics of contingent work relations. Yet, with 
certain exceptions, its actual history and sociological functions have 
been sorely neglected. This is unfortunate since the issue of temporary 
and contingent work has had an important, and at times central, place 
in U.S. labor struggles since industrialization. The ever-present real-
ity of temporary work in twenty-first century labor markets makes it 
important to incorporate into our labor history and legal lexicon the 
forgotten story of how profit-driven private agencies were character-
ized by workers and regulated by proworker legislation. Awareness of 
these past labor struggles can assist in forming a new vision of how to 
craft laws and build organization to halt the spread of the contemporary 
staffing industry’s nonunion empire. This chapter employs this history 
in conjunction with established principles of workplace law to construct 
an understanding of commercial staffing agencies and to bring the legal 
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analysis of these entities into line with their actual labor market role. 
Our analysis points to the need for a legal reclassification of these for-
profit LMIs in order to create meaningful standards of regulation. 
In recent years, unions and community-based organizations have 
undertaken reform efforts to regulate some of the most egregious temp 
agency practices on a state by state basis. This, of course, is in no way 
objectionable and may indeed represent the beginnings of a more com-
prehensive reform movement. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
piecemeal legislative initiatives enacted in any state cannot effectively 
regulate the multinational staffing business. Indeed, the same conclusion 
was reached early in the twentieth century by the progressive reform-
ers who crafted state-level regulatory regimes for private employment 
agencies that were far more extensive than anything being proposed 
today. Ultimately, the reformers proposed federal regulation, which 
nearly materialized in 1941 with the introduction of “A Bill to Regulate 
Private Employment Agencies Engaged in Interstate Commerce” (U.S. 
Congress 1941). Essentially, this legislation would have required pri-
vate agencies to be licensed under the U.S. Department of Labor and to 
comply with a list of detailed provisions modeled on the most stringent 
state employment agency laws at the time. 
If not for the entrance of the United States into World War II and the 
concomitant changes in employment brought on by the war, we might 
have federal regulation of the staffing industry today. It took another 30 
years before Senator Walter Mondale and Congressman Abner Mikva 
introduced similar bills to have the U.S. Department of Labor regu-
late the temporary help industry.38 Unfortunately, these bills were intro-
duced long before organized labor recognized the temp industry as an 
expansive and exploitative purveyor of low wage work. Recent atten-
tion to the vulnerability of day laborers has resulted in a new legislative 
initiative, the Day Labor Fairness and Protection Act. The bill’s provi-
sions include a series of measures that specifically target temp agencies 
which deploy day laborers involved in construction and manufacturing. 
These include mandating wage parity with full-time permanent workers 
at a worksite, prohibitions on any restrictions on a day laborer’s right to 
accept permanent work at the employer’s workplace, health and safety 
provisions, and the registration of day labor agencies.39
This bill is in line with reform proposals that stem from our analysis 
and are aimed at incorporating the regulation of for-profit LMIs into 
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federal labor law, an approach that is far more appropriate and parsi-
monious than prior reform measures. For one, the solution we suggest 
eliminates the legal double standard that bifurcates the regulation of 
LMIs—extensive federal oversight and regulation of union-run hiring 
halls on the one hand, and a laissez-faire system for the profit-driven 
temp industry on the other. Moreover, this approach replaces the long 
list of detailed and difficult-to-administer provisions contained in the 
early state employment agency laws with an overarching and well-es-
tablished legal principle—a fiduciary-like duty of the temp or staffing 
agency to fairly represent the workers it deploys in the labor market. 
Specifically, this proposed legal reform involves two changes to federal 
labor law: first, adding a definition of for-profit LMIs to Section 2 of the 
LMRA to identify them as legal entities distinct from employers, and 
second, incorporating into the law—possibly through a revision to the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act—a legal duty which 
requires for-profit LMIs to fully inform and fairly represent the workers 
they deploy. Fulfilling this duty might require temp agencies to, for ex-
ample, provide workers with written receipts specifying pay rates and 
other terms of employment, make known the difference between the 
wages paid a temp worker and the amount the agency is receiving from 
the user firm, and require the use of objective standards to determine 
which workers are referred to preferred jobs. 
In sum, by crafting a statutory provision defining for-profit LMIs 
and developing a concomitant set of legal obligations owed temp work-
ers, federal law would impose an enforceable level of transparency on 
temp agencies comparable to that which it requires of hiring halls and 
unions. Such a change would make it an unfair labor practice for a temp 
agency to breach its legal obligation to fairly represent the workers it 
sends to user firms.
Second, labor advocates should push to level the playing field so 
that union-run LMIs can compete in the labor market with for-profit 
agencies. Currently, commercial staffing agencies regularly enter into 
contracts with user firms that function as prehire agreements, and very 
often they enforce what are in effect exclusive “closed shop” hiring 
arrangements. The statutory text of the LMRA as currently interpreted 
turns a blind eye to these staffing industry practices, thus privileging 
for-profit LMIs over traditional union hiring halls, since the latter are 
legally precluded from using prehire agreements outside the construc-
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tion industry, and are prohibited in all cases from instituting a closed 
shop. To remedy this imbalance, Section 8(f) of the LMRA should be 
reformed to allow prehire agreements for all private sector unions in 
order to create a modicum of parity with the manner in which the com-
mercial staffing industry routinely negotiates its hiring agreements with 
employers. The logic behind this proposal becomes clearly apparent 
when it is recalled that the construction industry was allowed an exemp-
tion from the prohibition against prehire agreements in recognition of 
the short-term and transient nature of employment in that industry. To-
day, it is widely recognized that such casual labor markets are a reality 
throughout the economy, which is the very reason for the commercial 
success of the temp and staffing industry.
Most labor activists recognize that, given current political realities, 
U.S. labor law is, for the time being, relatively impermeable to revision 
in labor’s favor. The courts have been averse to providing an expansive 
judicial interpretation of federal workplace law, and labor’s needs have 
fared no better in Congress. But the mood and views of legislators and 
judges can change quickly, as demonstrated by the rapid adoption of 
legal reforms following the labor movement’s popular upsurge in the 
early 1930s. Indeed, labor and its allies are now organizing for and an-
ticipating the next working class upsurge or social movement as a means 
of shifting the balance of class forces in America (Clawson 2003). It is 
during these upsurges that fundamental legal reform becomes possible. 
We hope that this chapter provides some tools that, in the course of 
future struggles, can aid in ending the mistreatment of temp workers by 
commercial staffing agencies, and in building pro-worker alternatives.
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 1.  The national trade association officially altered its name from “temporary help” 
to “staffing” industry in the 1990s. In this chapter we use those two terms, as well 
as “temporary help firm” and “staffing firm,” interchangeably. A version of this 
chapter appears elsewhere (see Freeman and Gonos 2005).  
 2.  331 NLRB 173 (2000).
 3.  From 1982 to 1998 the number of temporary jobs rose 577 percent, while the 
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total number of jobs in the workforce grew only 41 percent. Consequently, the 
board noted, “certain industries and communities have begun to rely heavily on 
agency temps.” From 331 NLRB 173 (2000), citing and quoting U.S. General 
Accounting Office (2000).
 4.  H.S. Care L.L.C., D/B/A Oakwood Care Center and N&W Agency, Inc. and New 
York’s Health and Human Service Union, 1199, Service Employees International 
Union, Petitioner, 343 NLRB 76 (November 19, 2004).
 5.  Since 1947, national labor policy has been guided by the principle that federal 
labor law encourages equality of bargaining power for workers by protecting 
statutorily defined employees from employer and labor union interference with 
workers rights. See Findings and Policies of the Labor Management Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1. More specifically, the parity principle is exemplified in the 
parallel provisions of Sections 8(a) and 8(b) of the LMRA, which, respectively, 
subject employers and unions to charges of unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. 
§8(a) & (b). 
 6.  Of course, as Wilborn (1997) also points out, even though both union hiring halls 
and staffing firms are in a position to institute multi-employer benefits plans, 
such plans are only routinely provided by union hiring halls.
 7.  Union hiring halls, of course, are designated as an exclusive representative and 
provider of labor pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 159(a); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Assoc. Local Union No. 6, 
493 U.S. 67, 87 (1989). But staffing firms also routinely enter into agreements 
with employers that preclude workers’ abilities to secure jobs with a certain em-
ployer except through the agency (van Jaarsveld 2000).
 8.  Lucas v, NLRB, 333 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2003).
 9.  The agricultural labor contractor is a third conspicuous type of LMI, which de-
spite attempts at regulation, remains another prime source of exploitation of low-
wage workers.
 10.  See generally Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). 
 11.  244 U.S. 590 (1917). But see Justice Brandeis’s dissent, which would have up-
held the “Abolishing Employment Offices Measure,” and which details the ex-
ploitive practices which, in his view, justifiably permitted the state to ban exploi-
tive hiring agency practices. 
 12.  See David J. Oliveiri, “Unions Discriminatory Operation of Exclusive Hiring 
Hall as Unfair Labor Practice Under Section 8(b) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,” Section 3, 73 American Law Reports Fed. 171 (1985).
 13.  IBEW Local 99 (Crawford Electric Construction Co)., 214 NLRB 723 (1974); 
NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 549 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922.
 14.  NLRB v. Local 139, IUOE, 796 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Int’l.Assoc., 491 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1974).
 15.  Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l. Assoc. Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 78 n. 3 
(1989). 
 16.  See 29 U.S.C. §8(f).
 17.  See, e.g., Private Employment and Information Agencies, Conn. Gen. Stat. ch. 
300   Freeman and Gonos
564. Section 129(e) defines a temporary help service as a “business which con-
sists of employing individuals directly for the purpose of furnishing part-time or 
temporary help to others” (emphasis added). Section 130(c) states that the provi-
sions of chapter 564, the employment agency law, do not apply to any temporary 
help service.
 18.  Lee Hospital, 300 NLRB 947 (1990).
 19.  Technically, temps could always legally organize unions vis à vis their agency 
employer, but for practical reasons this proved a non-viable strategy. See All-
Work, Inc. and Warehouse and Mail Order Employees Union, Local 743 IBT, 
193 NLRB No. 137 (1971). See also Mehta and Theodore (2000–2001, 2003–
2004).
 20.  Temp firms still characterize themselves as labor market neutrals when it suits 
their purposes, e.g., in public relations where they claim to serve workers and 
client firms equally. Inappropriately, some academic studies are still prone to 
understand them as neutral “matching” institutions, despite their clear alliance 
with employers.
 21.  Grounded in the common law precept, the NLRB has stated that an employer-
employee relationship exists “where the person for whom the services are per-
formed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but also the 
means to be used in reaching such end.” Deaton Truck Line, 143 NLRB 1372 
(1963). 
 22.  While the question of withholding taxes and social security payments from 
workers is a relevant factor, it has not been considered determinative. Frederick 
O. Glass 135 NLRB 217, enforced in part 317 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1963). See also 
Hardin (1998, p. 1595).
 23.  One reaches the same conclusion applying the “hybrid test” that combines the 
right of control and economic realities tests (Rahebi 2000).
 24.  Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997).
 25.  The immediate ramifications of the decision for other companies were limited 
due to the fact that the court’s ruling was based on specific pension plan language 
that other major user firms could learn to avoid, and also because other circuits 
were unlikely to follow the 9th Circuit’s lead.
 26.  331 NLRB 173 (2000).
 27.  Prior Board decisions had established a bargaining unit rule which, in effect, 
precluded temporary workers from joining or accreting into a bargaining unit 
comprised of the user employer’s workers without the consent of both the tem-
porary agency and the user firm. Greenhoot, Inc., 205 NLRB 250 (1973); Lee 
Hospital, 300 NLRB 947 (1990).
 28.  Tree of Life, Inc. d/b/a Gourmet Award Foods, N. E., 336 NLRB 77 (2001). 
 29.  Oakwood Care Center, the board’s new, regressive ruling on the temp agency 
work relationship, reserves a good deal of indignation for what it labels the 
“anomalous” Tree of Life ruling because it extended what it calls “the strained 
logic of Sturgis” by ordering the accretion of the temp workers into the user em-
ployer’s bargaining unit and mandating that the temps be subject to terms of the 
user employer’s collective bargaining agreement with its union. See Oakwood 
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Care Center, 343 NLRB 76 (2004). Tree of Life is, of course, in the direct lineage 
of the M.B. Sturgis decision and, therefore, is implicitly overruled by Oakwood 
Care. See note 4.
 30.  See Plumbers and Pipe Fitters Local Union No. 32 v. NLRB, 50 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) citing, inter alia, Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l. Ass’n. Local 
Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 89 (1989). 
 31.  The “settlement range” within which this bargaining takes place is sometimes 
quite narrow. Some employers set their “purchase price” for specific classes of 
labor which is then marked down by the agency to arrive at the workers wage 
(van Jaarsveld 2000, p. 115). In other cases a simple “cost-plus” formula is used, 
as when staffing agencies engaged in “payrolling” add their standard mark-up to 
the hourly wage paid at the time of the agreement.
 32.  A typical “employees’ agreement” states, “I understand that all matters relating 
to wages and rates are necessarily confidential and will never discuss same with 
clients or others” (Lewis and Schuman 1988, p. 62).
 33.  “Do not discuss pay rates with Kelly employees; Kelly is their employer and 
should handle all pay rates.” From the Users Guide for Ordering & Managing 
Contract Labor—Johnson & Johnson/Kelly Services.
 34.  By 1994, Manpower reportedly controlled 330 client sites, up from just 15 in 
1992 (Feder 1995, 37).
 35.  Sec. 8(f)(4). See Rep. No. 187 on S.1555, 86th Cong., 1st Session 27–29 (1959), 
Legislative History of the Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the LMRA.
 36.  Responding to criticism, Microsoft announced in 1999 that it would open up 
competition among agencies to allow temporary software testers a choice from 
among three “approved” agencies. Washington Alliance of Technology Workers, 
“Microsoft Revises Contingent Worker Policies” (April 2, 1999).
 37.  Users Guide for Ordering & Managing Contract Labor—Johnson & Johnson/
Kelly Services, n.d , 26–27.
 38.  See H.R. 10349, “A Bill to Establish and Protect the Rights of Day Laborers” 
(1971) and H.R. 9298, “The Temporary Help Employee Protection Act” (1977). 
Although somewhat different in nature, there were also legislative efforts to ob-
tain fairness for temp workers introduced the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, by 
Congresswoman Pat Schroeder (“Part-Time and Temporary Workers Protection 
Act,” 1987) and Senator Howard Metzenbaum (“Contingent Workforce Equity 
Act,” 1994).
 39. 2003 Cong. U.S. HR 2870, introduced July 24, 2003.
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